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A recent well-publicised book, by the director-
general of the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI) and World Food Prize winner, Per
Pinstrup-Andersen, opens with a story. The story is
one of a ‘skinny three-year-old girl’ who ‘lay dying
on a mat, surrounded by crying relatives’ in a
village in south-western Zimbabwe during the
summer of 1999.1 The imagery is powerful, the
story familiar from media reports of famine in
Africa and the conclusion (to what is promoted as
a ‘balanced’ and ‘unemotional’ perspective2) clear: if
well harnessed, agricultural biotechnology can
solve the problems of famine and hunger in sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia.
The argument of this book – and a whole swathe of
other recent publications from reputable and well
networked organisations – whether the CG3 centres
like IFPRI, national science academies, the OECD,
the Rockefeller Foundation or the World Bank4 – is
simple. With growing populations and declines in
yield growth of basic food crops in the post-Green
Revolution era, increasing yield growth is essential.
New biotechnological applications, and in particular
transgenics, are important parts of the way forward.
This is portrayed by some as perhaps the only
feasible ethical standpoint for the international
community. Pinstrup-Andersen again notes:
If technological development bypasses poor
people, opportunities for reducing poverty,
food insecurity, child malnutrition and natural
resource degradation will be missed, and the
productivity gap between developing and
developed country agriculture will widen.
Such an outcome would be unethical indeed
(Pinstrup-Andersen and Cohen 2000: 22).
The core justification for this increasingly
influential position is essentially neo-Malthusian in
character. Production (and to some extent
nutritional improvement) is the key, and
redistribution/access issues, while important, are
infeasible to implement. For example, the highly
influential Nuffield report rejects the option of
redistribution, and argues for a focused
technological solution to create a pro-poor biotech:
Political difficulties of redistribution within, let
alone among, countries are huge. Logistical
problems and costs of food distribution alsoIDS Bulletin Vol 33 No 4 2002
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militate against sole reliance on redistributing
income (i.e. demand for food) to meet present,
let alone future, needs arising from increasing
populations in less developed countries. Hence
we must stress the importance of any new
options that will secure higher direct and
indirect employment and cheap food in labour-
surplus developing countries....What is
required is a major increase in support for GM
crop research and outreach directed at
employment-intensive production of food
staples within developing countries (Nuffield
Council on Bioethics 1999: 4.8, 4.10).
For the biotech advocates, then, population
pressure is the core factor, the Green Revolution is
the model solution, while a focused, biotech ‘Gene
Revolution’ is the future. The FAO’s biotech policy
statement follows this now frequently repeated line:
Agriculture is expected to feed an increasing
human population, forecast to reach 8,000
million by 2020, of whom 6,700 million will
be in the developing countries. Although the
rate of population growth is steadily
decreasing, the increase in absolute numbers of
people to be fed may be such that the carrying
capacity of agricultural lands could soon be
reached given current technology. New
technologies, such as biotechnologies, if
properly focused, offer a responsible way to
enhance agricultural productivity now and for
the future... (FAO 2000, para. 1).
This ‘feeding a hungry world’ narrative is reflected
in the justifications for most policy positions of
core international organisations (and in much
biotech industry publicity materials besides). How
are these positions justified? A recent flurry of
increasingly sophisticated – but inevitably
assumption laden – models have rekindled a policy
focus on food security issues, and an emphasis on
the need to increase agricultural production for
growing populations. This has been further fuelled
by debates about the implication of new trade
regimes under the WTO. These discussions have
firmly re-established the centrality of global food
security issues in international policy discourse –
with scenario models, production gap predictions
and Malthusian overtones surprisingly reminiscent
of the debates in the 1970s.
For example, the influential report on ‘World Food
Prospects’ (again produced by IFPRI) argues that,
due to increasing populations, growing
urbanisation, and rising incomes, there will be a 40
per cent escalation of demand for cereals up to
2020 (Pinstrup-Andersen et al. 1999). A growing
demand for meat is resulting in a ‘livestock
revolution’ which will require increasing volumes
of grain as fodder. In order to meet this demand,
yield increases are essential, as cultivated areas are
only expected to rise by a fifth. With trends in yield
growth predicted to continue downwards, this will
require a doubling of imports of grains to the
developing world. Projected population increases
are concentrated in Asia, with India and China
accounting for a third of the estimated growth to
2020. In the model, China is forecast to account for
a quarter of global increases in demand for cereals,
and two-fifths of the increased demand for meat.
Although population growth is not likely to be as
significant in Africa (especially given the HIV/AIDS
pandemic), and there remain opportunities for
increasing production through expansions of
cultivated area, sub-Saharan Africa is the region
least able to deal with the consequences of
declining yield growth and the prospects for
increasing world food prices, especially given the
declining availability of food aid. For IFPRI and
others, agricultural biotechnology is seen as a
potentially neat, technical, science-based,
apparently apolitical solution to this unfolding
scenario.
But what is the likelihood of such an outcome? Will
technological solutions deliver real benefits to the
poor, and so eliminate hunger and famine? Is the
science up to it? Are the political and economic
conditions right? Are there enough public
resources available? Will the private sector play
ball? Are there other solutions that might deliver
similar – or even better – returns to the undeniably
important issue of raising agricultural production if
given the support? In what was otherwise a report
very supportive of biotech, the Nuffield Council
sounded a helpful note of caution:
As GM crop research is organised at present, the
following worst case scenario is all too likely:
slow progress in those GM crops that enable
poor countries to be self-sufficient in food;
advances directed at crop quality or management
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Box 1: Ten key (sometimes hidden) assumptions of the pro-poor biotech advocates
l The priority for tackling poverty and food insecurity needs to be through focused technological transfer
to support agricultural development, rather than broader institutional reforms and livelihood responses.
l Declining yield growth in the major food crops is the key factor affecting food insecurity and both
chronic and acute famine. Access/market/distribution/security/conflict issues, while important, are
secondary and more difficult to deal with because of their complexity.
l Modern biotechnology can deliver the solutions to key agricultural constraints affecting poor people,
including resistance to pests and diseases, salt and drought tolerance and yield improvements in
crops that have not responded to conventional breeding. Public research efforts will be focused on
those crops and traits that the private sector will not touch. Research will in turn result in some
significant breakthroughs on a par with the breeding efforts of the Green Revolution era.
l The resulting products will be acceptable to farmers because they will provide improved returns,
both reducing costs and providing tangible benefits. Farmers and consumers will become
accustomed to the new products as they have with other earlier technologies, such as hybrids and
new foods. Public education will be key in this regard.
l Biotechnology options offer more cost-effective and sustainable solutions to key agricultural
problems than more conventional, lower tech solutions. The diversion of limited research funds to
biotech will pay dividends in the longer run, and is a better bet than spending scarce resources on
‘sustainable agriculture’ or ‘low external input’ options.
l Major increases in international public research funds will be available for both basic and applied
research in high-end biotechnology. This will result in well-equipped labs staffed by highly qualified
scientists in both the international and national agricultural research systems in the developing world.
l Intellectual property issues will be dealt with through ‘public-private partnerships’ modelled on the
Vitamin-A rice deal brokered by the Rockefeller Foundation. Private companies with proprietary
rights over key genes or processes will give these up for public good research and development on
‘orphan’ crops and ‘difficult’ traits, with no strings attached.
l The private sector will deliver biotech solutions to developing countries suited to local needs in
areas where returns are guaranteed. This might include high value crops (e.g. horticulture), cash
crops (e.g. cotton) and crops where hybrids are well established (e.g. maize). Liberalised,
competitive global markets will encourage low prices and the best technology being delivered. The
associated technology fees applied will not prevent smaller farmers reaping the benefits of the new
globalised agri-food system.
l Food and biosafety issues will not be a major issue in the promotion of biotechnology. Transgenic
products are essentially ‘substantially equivalent’, and in many cases the introduction of new crops will
be a familiar process, not significantly different from traditional plant breeding. Problems of antibiotic
markers and potential resistance will be ironed out in time through scientific developments.
l Regulatory issues will be dealt with throughout the world by international ‘capacity building’ efforts in
developing standardised, harmonised regulations for the agricultural biotechnology sector. With new
regulations in place these will be enforced consistently and effectively throughout the developing world.
rather than drought tolerance or yield
enhancement; emphasis on innovations that save
labour costs (for example, herbicide tolerance),
rather than those which create productive
employment; major yield-enhancing progress in
developed countries to produce, or substitute for
GM crops now imported (in conventional non-
GM) form from poor countries (Nuffield Council
on Bioethics 1999: 4.23).
Similar issues are raised in the ‘Seven Academies’
report:
Current industrial biotechnology is primarily
oriented to the needs of large-scale commercial
agriculture, rather than to those of the
subsistence farmer. Most developing countries
lack the financial resources and are limited in
the scientific infrastructure needed to develop
their own biotechnology programmes for the
crops that are important to feed their people.
The long-term decline of public agricultural
research, the increasing privatisation of GM
technologies, and the growing emphasis on the
crops and priorities of the industrialised
nations do not bode well for feeding the
increasing populations of the developing
world...without changed incentives for sharing
access to GM technologies, the world is
unlikely to direct much of its research for
improved nutrition and employment-based
access to staples for the poor (Royal Society et
al. 2000, Ch 7).
So what are the advocates of a pro-poor
biotechnology assuming when they argue for the
importance of seeing agricultural biotechnology as
the solution to global famine problems? In the
writings of IFPRI and others, these assumptions are
often well hidden, so keen are they, it appears, to
make the case for biotech. But for a more fulsome
and balanced debate we need to identify the
assumptions, and interrogate them, testing them
against our knowledge of particular places,
contexts and economic and policy trajectories.
Box 1 identifies ten key assumptions, each of
which need thorough and urgent discussion. If the
assumptions stand up, then the argument for pro-
poor biotechnology should be supported. If they
don’t, then we must be more cautious, and think
hard about alternatives, but also begin to tackle
more fundamental (often difficult, controversial
and political) issues which may stand in the way of
the realisation of pro-poor biotech options. Sadly
many of these assumptions are currently not being
debated in the fora that dominate international
biotechnology policy-making. The influential
players tend to take an optimistic view of
technology potentials and downplay the difficulties
presented by the political economy of
biotechnology, with talk of ‘win-win’ solutions,
public-private partnerships, and capacity building
to improve regulatory efficacy.
Yet in other fora, conventionally excluded from
mainstream decision-making, debates may be
framed quite differently. Here concerns are raised
about corporate control of agriculture, changing
livelihood opportunities, the dominance of
intellectual property ownership by a few, and the
uncertainties inherent in regulatory science.
Unfortunately the biotech debate has become
exceptionally polarised, with positions becoming
entrenched around both global and national
struggles for positions (Stone 2002). This scenario –
provoked and reinforced by the fierce controversy
particularly in Europe, and the advocacy positions
of corporates, governments, and NGOs – has
perhaps undermined the quality and depth of the
debate about what type of rural future is wanted in
different (highly context-specific) parts of the
world, what type of agriculture improves
livelihoods and reduces vulnerabilities, and what
form of regulation responds to both scientific
uncertainties and public disquiet.
There are, however, some experiments emerging
which offer insights as to how a different type of
policy deliberation might occur, where alternative
perspectives and different framings of the debate
have a place (Holmes and Scoones 2000). In the
few examples that have been convened in the
developing world around biotechnology, there have
been concerted and often heated debates about the
assumptions listed in Box 1. For example, in
citizen juries in India, poor rural producers have
asked – drawing on their own experience and their
own worldviews – many searching questions about
the impacts of a biotech revolution, as currently
conceived, on livelihood choices and options
(Pimbert and Wakeford 2002; Wakeford 2000).
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While inevitably imperfect and only experimental
at this stage, such deliberative policy processes
offer one route for encouraging a challenging of
assumptions by those who are currently excluded
from the mainstream policy debate.
Critics sceptical about the future of agricultural
biotechnologies in meeting food security needs and
preventing famine regard meeting all (or even
some) of these assumptions as highly unlikely.
Even accepting the importance of taking a twin-
track approach – acknowledging that production is
important, as well as access and distribution – they
question the likelihood of biotech science
delivering the type of products that would make a
big difference in the medium or even long term.
Even if the science was up to it, a variety of other
factors, which make a pro-poor biotech unlikely,
are pointed to. Among these are: the limited
availability of public funds (and the low likelihood
of a sudden flood arriving soon); the complications
of intellectual property arrangements, and the
aggressive insistence of the private sector majors in
holding on to their proprietary rights; and
constraints associated with the way the agri-food
industry is increasingly organised around a limited
number of multinational companies.
The most likely scenario, they argue, is more or less
the ‘worst case’ one identified by the Nuffield
report, one that results in an increasing domination
of the agriculture sector by the ‘big six’
multinationals, and the promotion of biotech
products, which will have potential only among
better off farmers in the higher resource
endowment areas. The limited publicly supported,
pro-poor technologies will be cast-offs, or public
relations stunts, and will not make significant
impacts on poverty and hunger, they claim.
However, all is not rosy on the other side of the
fence either. The critics, in turn, must assume that
the development of alternative technologies can
result in the necessary returns (in terms of
production, risk reduction, etc.) to increase food
security, over areas far larger than the relatively
isolated case examples documented to date. They
must also assume that policies for local, national
and international redistribution of food will take
place, in contexts where governments are weak,
and trends towards liberalisation and reduced
government intervention are ongoing, and being
reinforced by international agreements on trade
and aid conditionalities by donors.
The debate is still ongoing. However, the emerging
mainstream ‘consensus’ position on ‘pro-poor
biotechnology’ is far from established. If poor
people are to benefit from biotechnology
applications, then some fairly far-reaching issues of
politics and political economy in the agri-food
sector will need to be addressed head on. With the
current cosy talk of win-win solutions, couched in
a swathe of assumptions, this is unlikely to happen
without a major redefinition of the parameters of –
and, crucially, participants in – the debate.
The current technicised style of discussion,
sidelining the difficult issues of politics, control
and power, may, in the long term, actually
undermine the capacity of poor people to benefit
from these new technologies, which potentially
have so much promise. But we should not be
deceived by the promises of the future, while the
realpolitik of the present needs to be dealt with.
While there are undoubtedly some examples where
biotech applications have benefited poor people
already – and there may well be more in the future,
if the science optimists are to be believed – the
more strategic, yet often unasked, question for the
international research and policy community must
remain: is this the right track – if the core objective
is reducing poverty and preventing famine – and if
it is deemed at least a partial best bet, what is being
missed out by pursuing it? The answer to this
remains far from clear.
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Notes
* This article is based on ongoing DFID-supported
work on ‘Agricultural Biotechnology and Policy
Processes in Developing Countries’, with fieldwork
being carried out in China, India and Zimbabwe.
This article is, in particular, based on a background
paper prepared for the project (see Scoones 2002).
1. Pinstrup-Andersen, P. and Schioler, E., 2001. The
quote is from the opening page.
2. See the commendations from Lester Brown from the
Worldwatch Institute and Gordon Conway, President
of the Rockefeller Foundation.
3. Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research.
4. See, for example: World Bank (Kendall et al. 1997);
CGIAR/National Academy of Science 1999; OECD
2000; Royal Society, et al. 2000; Conway 1999.
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